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Abstract. 
The crime of genocide has historical antecedents, dating back to several decades before its eventual acceptance as 
an international crime and codified as such. Ironically, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 1948 (the Genocide Convention) did not provide punishment for the crime of genocide or 
genocide related matters. Instead, it empowered the Contracting Parties to undertake to enact, in accordance with 
their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Convention and, in 
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide. But this lacuna is covered in Part 7 of 
Article 77 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), which provides applicable 
penalties for a person convicted of genocide or genocide related matters. Generally, conducts that amount to 
genocide are clear even though definition of the four classes of group ‘is an intricate problem that requires serious 
interpretative efforts’. This paper examines the crime of genocide under the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. The paper begins by examining the general overview of the crime of genocide by way of introduction and 
historical background; and then proceeds to appraise the very nature of the crime and the requirement of proving 
the offence. Noting the difficulties associated with proving the crime of genocide, particularly ‘intent’, the paper 
examines situations wherein inference can be drawn.  The paper concludes with overarching recommendations. 
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1. Introduction 
The definition of Genocide in the Genocide Convention has been incorporated into the various statutes namely: 
(a) the Rome Statute, (b) the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTYSt), 
(c) the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute (ICTRSt) as well as other court’s instruments 
established by or with the support of the UN.2 The Genocide Convention defines genocide in Article 2 as: 
‘... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such’: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Genocide is an indiscriminate killing of a group of people with total disregard for the individual’s life. Its 
immediate effect is death and, dehumanization. For example, it is estimated that more than two hundred thousand 
people were killed in Darfur, Sudan during the genocide and over two million persons were internally displaced.3 
Genocide has global impact. It disregards international law, creates political instability, destroys entire cultures, 
and obliterates morals. Kenneth J. Campbell in his book “Genocide and the Global Village” indicates that 
unchecked genocide will eradicate global cooperation and make larger conflicts inevitable If genocide goes 
 
1  Associate Professor and Deputy Head of Postgraduate School. Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies; B.A (Hons), LLB (Hons), 
MPA (O.A.U, Ile-Ife), B. L (Abuja), LLM (Nasarawa), Ph. D. (University of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom); 
 Associate Professor and Sub-Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies and Research, Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State; LLB (Hons), 
LLM (O. A. U, Ile-Ife), Ph.D. (Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State);  
2 Diane F Orentlicher, (1999)‘Genocide’ in Roy Gutman, David Rieff and Anthony Dworkin (ed) Crimes of War: What the Public Should 
Know 2.0 (Reprint – edition W W Norton & Co  191. 
3  “Civilian Devastation: Abuses by all Parties in the War in Southern Sudan “, (1994), Human Rights, Watch. 
www.hrw.org/hrw/pubweb/webcat-93.htm. Accessed on  26/11/2020. 
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unchecked, no group is save as every group could be the next target Campbell further said that even the most 
powerful nations may be drawn in and ultimately it may threaten civilization through accidental or international 
use of more powerful weapons. Genocide when compared with war crimes and crimes against humanity, is 
generally regarded as the most heinous crime. At worst, genocide pits neighbour against neighbour, or even 
husband against wife. Unlike war, where the attack is general and the object is after the control of a geographical 
or political region, genocide attack individual’s identity. The object is complete elimination of a group of people.  
Genocidal actions have, over the years, become wide spread; and although the word was coined in response 
to the Armenian and holocaust killings, it now applies to other mass killings such as the  Kurdish genocide in Iraq,1 
the Bosnian genocide,2 and the Rwandan genocide,3 amongst others. Importantly, developments in this area have 
led to genocide being recognised as a norm of international custom.4 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)5 
attested to this fact when it stated: “the principles expressed in the Genocide Convention are part of general 
customary international law”.6 Therefore, all states are under obligation to respect the principles whether or not 
they ratify the Convention. 7  This effectively imposes a responsibility on states to recognise genocide as a 
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens) to which no derogation is allowed. 8 The purpose of this paper 
is to examine the concept of Genocide as international criminal conduct set out in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). With specific reference to the nature of the crime, the paper highlights 
the crime as one that embodies the principle of special intent (dolus specialis) as well as the specific elements of 
the crime in relation to what is required to effectively establish that the crime of genocide has been committed. 
 
2. Historical Perspective 
Genocide is historically linked to a Polish lawyer called Raphael Lemkin,9 who coined the word from the Greek 
and Latin prefixes-genos (race/tribe) and cide (killing). The word was devised (a) in reaction to the Nazi policies 
of systematic murder of Jewish people during the holocaust; and (b) in response to previous instances in history 
of targeted actions aimed at destroying particular groups of people.10 Events of that period led Lemkin to steer a 
vigorous campaign to actualise international recognition and codification of genocide as an international crime. 11 
Genocide was eventually recognised as a crime under international law in 1946 by a resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly (GA);12 and later codified as an independent crime under the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 (the Genocide Convention).13  
The need to recognise and codify genocide as international crime arises from the immense loss often 
associated with the conduct. This is expressed in a number of documents such as (a) the preamble to the Genocide 
Convention to the effect that “... at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity...”14 (b) 
the travaux préparatoires of the Convention which refers to genocide as an historical fact;15 and (c) a GA 
resolution16 that refer to many instances of crimes of genocide that occurred when “racial, religious, and other 
groups have been destroyed, entirely, or in part."17 This essentially reaffirms (i) the notion that genocide is not a 
new phenomenon; and (ii) that events that occurred before the adoption of the Genocide Convention have the 
 
1 This genocide took place between 1986-1989. It targeted the Kurds. Consequently, between 500, 000 and 182,000 Kurds were killed. See 
Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq, at <www.humanrightswatch.org> accessed 1 May 2018 
2 The Bosnian genocide usually refers either to the genocide committed by the Bosnian Serb forces in 1995 or the wider ethnic cleansing 
campaign throughout areas controlled by the Army that took place during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. See John Richard Thackrah, (2008): 
The Routledge Companion to Military Conflict since 1945 Routledge Companion Series, Taylor & Francis), 81-84 
3 This was the genocidal mass slaughter of the Tutsis in Rwanda where an estimated 500,000-1,000,000 Rwandans were killed during a 100-
day period from 7 April to mid-July 1994. See BBC, Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, 17 May 2011, <www.bbc.com> accessed 2 July 
2018 
4 A norm of international custom (jus cogens) is a peremptory norm that cannot be derogated from. See Lawrence R. Helfer and Ingrid B. 
Wuerth, (2016) “Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective” Michigan Journal of International Law, 37 (4), 563 
5 The ICJ was set up in 1945 under the UN Charter to be the principal organ of the organization and its basic instrument (Statute of the ICJ) 
forms part of the Charter-Chapter XIV. It began work in 1946. See ICJ at <www.icj-cij.org> 7 June 2018 
6 See ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro) Judgement, I.C.J Reports, 2007, pp 39-44 
7 Ibid 
8 See International Law Commission at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_14.shtml>7 June 2020 
9 Raphael Lemkin, (1944).Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law,  
10 Ibid. 
11 According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Lemkin began to campaign for genocide to be recognised as a crime under 
international after witnessing the horrors of the holocaust that claimed the lives of his entir.e family except his brother. See BBC, How do you 
define genocide? <www.bbc.com> 7 June 2020. 
12 See resolution A/RES/96-1. 
13 The Convention was adopted in 1948 but it came into force on 12 January 1951, the 19th day following the date of deposit of the twentieth 
instrument of ratification or accession, in accordance with article XIII has been ratified by 149 States as at January 2018. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Brill Online. The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Preparatoires (2 vols.) (2009), <http://brill.com> accessed 6 August 2018. 
16Resolution 96(I) (11 December 1946) of the United Nations General Assembly. 
17 Ibid. 
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characteristics of genocide as defined in the Convention.  
 
3. Definition of Genocide 
The word genocide was first defined in article II of the Genocide Convention as:  
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such: 
a Killing members of the group; 
b Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
d Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
With regard to this definition, the important point to note is that it came as an outcome of high-powered 
negotiating process that reflects the compromise reached among UN Member states in 19481 during the critical 
time of drafting the Convention. This possibly accounts for why the definition is adopted verbatim in article 6 of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute);2 and in some other Statutes of international and 
hybrid jurisdictions such as the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)3 and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).4   
Following the adoption of genocide as part of peremptory norm of international law, states began to 
criminalise it in their domestic law while many are yet to do so. An example of a state that has criminalised 
genocide is Ethiopia where the High Court tried and convicted former President Mengistu in absentia in Mengistu 
& ors5 on charges of genocide.6 However, several states are yet to specifically criminalise genocide in their 
national laws. 
 
4. Genocide under the ICC Statute 
The crime of genocide is one of the four omnibus crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC7as contained in article 
5 of the ICC Statute. As already noted and for purposes of emphasis, the critical need to create a special criminal 
court to try people for atrocities committed during armed conflict had been contemplated by the United Nations 
(UN) at different times after the Second World War (WW II) culminating in the setting up of two ad hoc tribunals 
in 1993 and 1994. This is for purposes of giving effect to the crime through the punishment of serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed, respectively, in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A series of 
negotiations to establish a permanent international criminal court that would have jurisdiction over serious 
international crimes regardless of where they were committed started up in 1994 and led to the adoption of the 
ICC Statute in July 1998 in Rome.  
This accomplishment is the culmination of years of effort and shows the resolve of the international 
community to ensure that those who commit grave crimes do not go unpunished. Genocidal actions were treated 
as a sub class of crimes against humanity until after the adoption of Genocide Convention in 1948 when it became 
crime per se. Genocide as a crime of individuals began to be punished following the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)8 and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR)9 both of which provide for the crime of genocide. 
 
1 See the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser 
2 The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court is the treaty, which established the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, structure 
and functions. It was adopted on July 17, 1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002 as the 60th instrument of ratification was deposited with 
the Secretary General on April 11, 2002 when 10 countries simultaneously deposited their instruments of ratification. See also, 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm: accessed 12 September 2020. 
3 The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is a UN Tribunal with jurisdiction to try war crimes committed during 
the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. It was established in 1993. More information about the Tribunal can be obtained at, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY; accessed 20 November 2020. 
4 The International Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the UN Security Council by resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 following wide 
spread violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda. The Tribunal was established to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
crimes in Rwanda between January 1 and December 31, 1994. More information on the establishment, powers and functions of the Tribunal 
are available at, http://www.unictr.org; accessed 6 December 2020. See also Article 5, Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia; U. N. Doc. S/25/04 at 36, and S/25704/Add.1 (1993); adopted by Security Council on May 25, 1993, U.N.Doc S/RES/827 (1993). 
5 See generally, Firew Kebede Tiba, (2007)  “The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethoipia” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2(1), 513-
528. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Article 1 of ICC Statute established the ICC to try crimes listed in article 5, i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and very 
recently, crime of aggression.  
8 The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is a UN Tribunal with jurisdiction to try war crimes committed during 
the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. It was established in 1993. More information about the Tribunal can be obtained at, 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY; accessed 17 November 2020. 
9 The International Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the UN Security Council by resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 following wide 
spread violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda. The Tribunal was established to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
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4.1. Elements of the Crime of Genocide 
The important point to note from the outset is the importance of article I of the Genocide Convention in terms of 
its content to wit: (a) that genocide could occur in the context of armed conflicts of international or non-
international nature, (b) it could also occur in peace times-this situation is not common even though it remains a 
possibility, (c) obligation of contracting parties to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. Authors, 
commentators and experts1 are however of the opinion that the definition of genocide under article II of the 
Genocide Convention is narrow, containing mainly two elements-mental (subjective) and physical (objective); and 
that what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. In general 
terms, elements of the crime of genocide are discussed in this paper under two heads-objective elements and 
subjective elements. 
4.1.1. Objective/physical element 
As noted above, conducts that may constitute genocide are clearly labelled in Article II of the Genocide Convention 
namely: 
a Killing members of a particular group referred to as a ‘protected group’ who may be of the same national, 
ethnic, racial or religious links. 2 
b Causing serious bodily or mental harm of a ‘protected group’ 
c Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part 
d Imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group; or 
e Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
For experts, conducts that amount to genocide are clear even though definition of the four classes of group 
‘is an intricate problem that requires serious interpretative efforts’.3 These conducts were clearly spelt out in a 
number of judgements of the ICTR, including the judgement in Akayesu case.4 Judicial pronouncements on the 
acts constituting genocide are highlighted as follows: 
a With regards of killing members of a group, ‘killing’ must be interpreted as ‘murder’ –voluntary or 
international killing 
b In terms of causing serious bodily or mental harm, the ICTR held in Akayesu that the harm caused ‘do 
not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent or irremediable’. It is enough if it involves harm that 
goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. Further, the harm must be such that 
results in grave and long term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.   
The ICTY TC relied on this pronouncement and stated clearly in Krstic5 that inhuman treatment; torture, 
rape, sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts that may cause serious bodily or mental harm. The 
ICT further include sexual violence, mental torture and persecution in Prosecutor v Blagojevic and Jokic6 
and Prosecutor v. Georges Nderubumwe Rutaganda.7 
c On the issue of deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction, the TC held in Akayesu that ‘subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic 
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirement(s), or 
the deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services. The 
list also extends to the ‘creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper 
housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion’.8 
d The ICTR in Akayesu also held that ‘imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group’ 
includes ‘sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control and the separation of the 
sexes and the probation of marriages’. More crucially, the measures may be physical or mental and 
include ‘rape as an act directed to prevent births when the woman is raped refuses subsequently to 
procreate.’9 
e With regards to forcibly transferring of children to another group, Article 6 (e) clearly specify elements 
 
crimes in Rwanda between January 1 and December 31, 1994. More information on the establishment, powers and functions of the Tribunal 
are available at, http://www.unictr.org; accessed 17 November 2020. 
1 See Kok-Thay Eng, Redefining Genocide, at <www.genocidewatch.org> accessed 17 November 2020.. See also, Carola Lingaas, (2015)  
“The Elephant in the Room: The Uneasy Task of Defining ‘Racial’ in International Criminal Law” 3 International Criminal Law Review 
2 Antonio Cassesse, (2008) International Criminal Law (2nd edn.: Oxford University Press) p.133 
3 Ibid 
4 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgement No: ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998) 
5 Radislav Krstic was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in connection with genocide of around 8, 000 Bosniak and civilians on 11 July 1995 
during the Srebrenica massacre (outcome of Bosnia-Serbia war), known to be Europe’s worst atrocity since WWII. On 2 August 2001, Krstic 
became the first man to be convicted of genocide by the ICTY and sentenced to 46 years in prison 
6  Case No. IT-02-60-T  (Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic (Judgement on Motions for Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98 Bis) International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 5 April 2004 www.refworld.org/cases.ICTY.47fdfb302.htm/ accessed 17 November 2020. 
7 Case No. ICTR-96-3-T  < www.refworld.org/cases.ICTR.415923304.html accessed 17 November 2020. 
8 See also Cassesse, note 28 at 133-134 
9 Ibid. Akayesu, note 30 at para, 507-8. 
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of the crime of genocide as follows: 
 The perpetrator forcibly transferred one or more persons 
 Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group 
 The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such. 
 The transfer was from that group to another group. 
 The person or persons were under the age of 18 years. Note that persons under the age of 18 are 
regarded as children as contained in international law instruments including the (CRC).1 
 The perpetrator knew, or should have known, that the person or persons were under the age of 
18 years. 
 The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against 
that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction. 
By and large, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group may constitute threats, intimidation 
leading to the forcible transfer of children to another group.2  
4.1.2. Subjective/mental element  
Article 9 of the ICC Statute stipulates that elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the “interpretation and 
application of articles 6, 7 and 8 consistent with the Statute”. Regarding these elements, the provisions of the 
Statute, including article 21 as well as the general principles set out in Part 3 are applicable. Article 30  
specifies that a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. Where no reference is made 
in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, it 
is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in article 30 applies. 
Exceptions to the article 30 standard, based on the Statute, (including applicable law under its relevant provisions), 
are indicated as: 
1. Existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances. 
2. In cases relating to mental elements associated with elements involving value judgment, such as those 
using the terms “inhumane” or “severe”, it is not necessary that the perpetrator personally completed a 
particular value judgment, unless otherwise indicated. 
The mental element is contained in Article II (1) of the Genocide Convention, Articles 5 and 30 of the ICC 
Statute that defined the crime; and contained in rules of international customary law and they are highlighted as: 
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Genocide has been 
summarised as a typical crime based on the ‘depersonalization of the victim.3 In other words, the victim of the 
crime is not really the object but rather the group to which the person belongs. Cassesse4 observed that those that 
commit the act of genocide against a victim only see the victim as a member of a protected group rather than as a 
human being. 
This type of intent, according to scholars,5 amounts to ‘aggravated criminal intent’ (dolus specialis)6 and is 
usually required in addition to the criminal intent accompanying the underlying offence- 
 killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
What can be inferred from this provision is that other categories of intent such as gross negligence and 
recklessness, etc. can be excluded. The ICTR TC in Akayesu defined the ‘aggravated criminal intent’ in relation 
to the commission of genocide, as ‘the specific intention required as a constitutive element of the crime which 
demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged’.7 
 
 
1 The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
44/25 of 20 November 1989. It entered into force September 2, 1990, in accordance with article 49. It is available at, 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm> accessed 17 November 2020. See also, The ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition 
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, was adopted at the 87th Session on June 17, 1999 
for the purpose of eliminating child labour and offer protection to children and young persons against labour exploitation. It came into force 
on November 19, 2000, but was ratified by Nigeria on October 2, available at, 
<www.un.org/children/conflict/keydocuments/english/iloconvention1828.html> accessed 28 November 2020. 
2 See Akayesu, note 30, at para 509, Antonio Cassesse, note 28 at 134. 
3 Dragan Jovasevic, (2017) The Crime of Genocide in Theory and Practice of Criminal Law of Republic of Serbia Voj No Delo. 4, 224-235 
4 Ibid. See also, Cassesse, note 28, p.137 
5 Aksar, Yusuf, (2009), “The Specific Intent (Dolus Specialis) Requirement of the Crime of Genocide: Confluence or Conflict between the 
Practice of Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICJ”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 6, No 23 p. 113-126.  
6 Paul Behrens, (2012) “Genocide and the Question of Motives” Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 10, Issue 3, 501-523 
7 Akayesu, note 30, para. 498, 517-522. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




5. Proof of the subjective/mental element in genocide 
With regards to proof of mental element, the TC acknowledged that proving the mental element is extremely 
difficult, and near impossible to determine; and accordingly set out guidelines on how the mental element can be 
inferred in the absence of a confession. According to the court, intent of the accused person can be inferred from 
a certain number of presumptions of fact, particularly from ‘all acts or utterances of the accused, or from the 
general context in which other culpable acts were perpetrated systematically against the same group’. This is 
regardless of whether such other acts were committed by the same perpetrator or by other perpetrators. This ruling 
was followed by the ICTR CT in several other cases including the case of The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema 
and Obed Ruzindana, Kajishema1 as well as Rutaganda.2  In Kayishema, the accused persons were charged with 
24 counts as prefect of Kibuye with involvement as a superior in the massacres, which occurred in that area from 
April to June 1994. Ruzindana was charged with five counts for his role in the crimes committed in Bisesero 
between 9 April and 30 June 1994.On 21 May 1999, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR found both Accused guilty of 
crimes of genocide. Kayishema was found guilty of four counts of genocide and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, while Ruzindana was found guilty of one count of genocide and was sentenced to 25 years of 
imprisonment. Both Accused appealed against their convictions and the sentence imposed on them. The appeal 
was based on several grounds including lack of equality of arms, defective indictment and inadequate proof against 
the accused. The Appeals Chamber, after examining the arguments, ruled that it was convinced that the Trial 
Chamber did not commit any error on a question of law or error of fact in the case. It therefore affirmed the 
judgment handed down by the Trial Chamber when convicting and sentencing the Accused. 
 
5.1. Elements required to be proved in a crime of genocide 
The requirement of ‘unlawfulness’ found in the ICC Statute3 or in other parts of international law, particularly 
international humanitarian law (IHL),4 is generally not specified in the elements of crimes. As used in the Elements 
of Crimes,5 the term ‘perpetrator’6 is nonaligned to guilt or innocence.7 The elements, including appropriate mental 
elements, apply, mutatis mutandis, to all those whose criminal responsibility may fall under Articles 258 and 289 
of the Rome Statute Further, a particular conduct may constitute one or more crimes. The elements of crimes are 
generally structured along the lines of certain principles: 
 As the elements of crimes focus on the conduct, consequences and circumstances associated 
with each crime, they are generally listed in that order; 
 Where required, a particular mental element is listed after the specific conduct, consequence or 
circumstance; and contextual circumstances are usually listed last 
In relation to the last element listed for each crime: The term “in the context of” would include the initial acts 
in an emerging pattern; 
 The term “manifest” is an objective qualification;  
 Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental element provided for in article 30, and 
recognizing that knowledge of the circumstances will usually be addressed in proving genocidal 
intent, the appropriate requirement, if any, for a mental element regarding this circumstance will 
need to be decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis. 
 
5.2. Intent required prior to the commission of the act of genocide   
The need to establish the presence of intention prior to the commission of was succinctly established by the TC in 
Kayishema and Ruzindana10 to the effect that “the mens rea must be formed prior to the commission of the 
 
1 Case No. ICTR-95-1-A 
2 Case No. ICTR-96-3-T   
3 The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court is the treaty, which established the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, structure 
and functions. It was adopted on July 17, 1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002 as the 60th instrument of ratification was deposited with 
the Secretary General on April 11, 2002 when 10 countries simultaneously deposited their instruments of ratification. See also, 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm: accessed 17 November 2020 
4 See for example, ICRC, Practice Relating to Rule 3. Definition of Combatants at <http:ihl-databases.icrc.org> 7June 2018. See also Articles 
2 (f), 8 (2)(a)(iv)(vii), 31(1)(a)(b)(c), 33 and 85b(1) of the Rome Statute. 
5 See Articles 9, 21 and 30 (1) of the Rome Statute. See also, Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, paras. 30-35 
6 See the Preamble and Article 53 (2)(c) 
7 See Articles 65 and 66 of the Rome Statute; and Antonio Cassesse, note 28. See also, Raphael Lemkin, (1944),  Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: 
Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
International Law, 63, 90-94 
8 This Article establishes individual criminal responsibility and confer jurisdiction on the ICC to try individuals who commit offences within 
the jurisdiction of the court  
9 This Article makes commanders and other superiors criminally liable for crimes (within the court’s jurisdiction) committed by persons or 
forces under their authority or control. 
10 (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 91 
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genocidal acts.” even though the individual acts do not necessarily require premeditation in which case the only 
consideration would be that the act is “done in furtherance of the genocidal intent”.1  
5.2.1. Specific mental elements required 
Intent to destroy in whole or in part: “in part” relates to the intention to destroy a considerable number of 
individuals of the same group.2 In that regard, the International Law Commission (ILC)3 stated that ‘the intention 
must be to destroy the group as such, meaning as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals 
because of their membership in particular group.’ 4     While agreeing with the ILC’s statement, the TC observed 
that the “intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the group”5 even though the destruction 
sought need not be directed at every member of the targeted group. The main import of the provisions of both the 
Genocide Convention and the ICC Statute relating to destruction, is that the meaning of destroy only encompass 
acts or conducts that amount to physical or biological genocide.6 There are several forms of destruction one of 
which is sexual violence.  
Generally, acts of sexual violence can form an integral part of the process of destruction of a group. This would 
be held to be the case where rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of women, their families and 
their communities belonging to a targeted group.  In the case of Rwanda, sexual violence was held to be an integral 
part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their 
destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.” 7   
a) Killing members of the group- to establish this particular offence, the prosecutor must show that an accused 
intended to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part; that the perpetrator intentionally killed one or more 
members of the group, without the necessity of premeditation; and that such victim or victims belonged to the 
targeted ethnical, racial, national, or religious group.8 In the particular instance, intent is required.9 Like in criminal 
law cases, causation of killing and other genocidal acts will be effected by an immediate proximate cause ion 
addition to the communication itself. Application of the principle of causation was considered in Akayesu where 
the Chamber found evidence of widespread killings throughout Rwanda sufficient to show both “killing” and 
“causing serious bodily harm to members of a group”. The evidence includes the following: 
 testimony regarding “heaps of bodies . . . everywhere, on the roads, on the footpaths and in rivers 
and, particularly, the manner in which all these people had been killed”, 
 testimony stating that “many wounded persons in the hospital . . . were all Tutsi and . . . 
apparently, had sustained wounds inflicted with machetes to the face, the neck, and also to the 
ankle, at the Achilles' tendon, to prevent them from fleeing”, 
 testimony that the “troops of the Rwandan Armed Forces and of the Presidential Guard [were] 
going into houses in Kigali that had been previously identified in order to kill” and testimony of 
other murders elsewhere; 
 “photographs of bodies in many churches” in various areas; and 
 testimony regarding “identity cards strewn on the ground, all of which were marked ‘Tutsi.’” 10 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group 
The TC in Akayesu, at paragraph 504 defined serious bodily or mental harm” as, inter alia, “acts of torture, be 
they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution.” This meaning should however be 
“determined on a case-by-case basis, using a common sense approach” according to the TC in Kayishema and 
Ruzindana,11noting that the meaning of  “causing serious bodily harm” does not need serious interpretation as it is 
largely self-explanatory, and “could be construed to mean harm that seriously injures the health, causes 
disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses. The harm caused here does 
not however need to be permanent or irremediable. By interpretation therefore, rape and sexual violence and threats 
during interrogation can qualify as stated in Akayesu, where the TC stated that rape and other acts of sexual 
violence constitute infliction of “serious bodily or mental harm” on members of the group;12 and that death threats 
during interrogation, alone or coupled with beatings, constitute infliction of “serious bodily or mental harm” 
 
1 ibid 
2 see Kayishema at paras 96-97 
3 The ILC was established by the General Assembly in 1947 to undertake the mandate of the Assembly under Article 13(1)(a) of the UN Charter 
to “initiate studies and make recommendations for the purposes of …encouraging the progressive development of international law…”. See 
UN, International Law Commission-Office of Legal Affairs, <www.legal.un.org> accessed 5 September 2018 
4 See the TC in Kayishema at paras 96-97 
5 see Bagilishema, (Trial Chamber), June 7, 2001, para. 64 
6 See the TC in Akayesu, note 30. See also, Elisa Novic, (2015)  Physical-Biological or Socio-cultural ‘Destruction’ in Genocide? Unveiling 
the Legal Underpinnings of Conflicting Interpretations Journal of Genocide Research 17, 63-82 
7 See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 95.    
8 Semanza, (Trial Chamber), May 15, 2003, para. 319 
9 See TC in Akayesu, note 30, para. 500-501. See also Article 2 (2) (a) of the Statute as well as Rutaganda at, para. 50 
10 See Akayesu, note 30 at, para. 114-116 
11 Kayeshima, para. 108-113 
12 See Akayesu, note 30 para. 706-707 and 731-734, 688. See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 108 
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inflicted on members of the group.1 The specific element of intent to inflict serious mental harm is specifically 
required here. 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part 
This phrase was interpreted in Akayesu2 to mean “methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not 
immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”3  This includes, 
“inter alia, subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction 
of essential medical services below minimum requirement.”4  The deliberate act of inflicting on a group the 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” was also interpreted by the 
TC to include “circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of proper housing, clothing, 
hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical exertion” and “methods of destruction which do not 
immediately lead to the death of members of the group.”5 Further, the TC held in Kayishema and Ruzindana,6 that 
although the Tutsi group in Kibuye were “deprived of food, water and adequate sanitary and medical facilities,” 
“these deprivations were not the deliberate creation of conditions of life . . . intended to bring about their 
destruction” because these “deprivations . . . were a result of the persecution of the Tutsis, with the intent to 
exterminate them within a short period of time thereafter;” and that the times periods “were not of sufficient length 
or scale to bring about destruction of the group.”7 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
One of the issues for consideration in Akayesu relates to the interpretation of this phrase. The TC held that imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group include: “sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, 
forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages”.8 A critical example is a patriarchal 
society9 where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, 
with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group. To that 
end, the TC noted that the measures might be mental as well as physical, referencing rape as a measure which can 
be intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that 
members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.10   
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
This phrase was again interpreted by the TC in Akayesu where it was observed that the objective of this phrase is 
two pronged-to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer; and to support acts of threats or trauma which 
would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.11 
f) Complicity in the crime of genocide  
Complicity in relation to the subjective element of genocide speaks to the issue of joint criminal enterprise12 as a 
principle of criminal law in which one or more persons perpetuate a criminal act with intent or knowledge.13 With 
regards to the element of complicity, the TC in Akayesu stated the true import of this concept and also laid the 
foundation for holding individuals accountable for conducts arising from mental element of complicity. 14 
According to the court,  
…the intent or mental element of complicity implies . . . that, at the moment he acted, the accomplice 
knew of the assistance he was providing in the commission of the principal offence. In other words, the 
accomplice must have acted knowingly.”  He is not required to “wish that the principal offence be 
committed.”  “[A]nyone who knowing of another's criminal purpose, voluntarily aids him or her in it, can 
be convicted of complicity even though he regretted the outcome of the offence.  Thus, the mens 
rea . . . required for complicity in genocide is knowledge of the genocidal plan. 
This principally means that the perpetrator must have acted intentionally, knowing fully well that he was aiding, 
abetting or contributing to the offence of genocide “including all its material elements” as, stated in Semanza 
 
1 Ibid 




6 Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 548 
7 Ibid 
8 Akayesu, note 30,  para. 507-508 
9 in patriarchal societies, identity of the child is determined by that of the father. 
10 See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 117; Rutaganda, (Trial Chamber), December 6, 1999, para. 
53;Musema, (Trial Chamber), January 27, 2000, para. 158. 
11 Akayesu note 30, para. 509:  See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 118; Rutaganda, (Trial Chamber), 
December 6, 1999, para. 54; Musema, (Trial Chamber), January 27, 2000, para. 159. 
12 See Elies van Sliedregt, “Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide” (2007) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 5 (1), 184-207 
13 Ibid 
14 Akayesu, note 30 para. 540-545 
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supra.1 This raises the question of the nature of complicity in genocide. In that regard, unlike in the case of the 
main perpetrator of the crime of genocide, the element of dolis specialis is not required in the case of complicity. 
This was the position of the TC in Akayesu2 where it stated that: 
[T]he intent of the accomplice is . . . to knowingly aid or abet one or more persons to commit the crime 
of genocide.”  “Therefore . . . an accomplice to genocide need not necessarily possess the dolus 
specialis of genocide, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group, as such.”  Thus, “an accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide if he knowingly 
aided or abetted or instigated one or more persons in the commission of genocide, while knowing that 
such a person or persons were committing genocide, even though the accused himself did not have the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
 
6. Elements not required to be proved 
a) Specific plan not required, but is strong evidence of intent 
The rule that specific plan is not required was elucidated by the TC in Kayishema and Ruzindana3 where it was 
held that although a specific to destroy does not actually represent an element of genocide, it would appear that 
carrying out the act of genocide would be difficult in the absence of such a plan “or organisation”. The ruling 
explains the irrelevance of a specific plan as bearing on the impossibility of the crime of genocide to be committed 
“without some or indirect involvement on the part of the State given the magnitude of this crime;” hence it 
becomes   “unnecessary for an individual to have knowledge of all details of genocidal plan or policy.” 4 However, 
the existence of a genocidal plan would be strong evidence of the specific intent requirement for the crime of 
genocide.5 
b) Actual extermination of entire group not required 
The principle relating to the extermination of the group is such that it is not necessary for the entire group to be 
destroyed. But it is sufficient that once any one of the acts mentioned in Article 2(2)(a) through 2(2)(e) is 
committed with the specific intent to destroy ‘in whole or in part’ a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”6 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to establish genocide throughout country. Except in the case of Rwanda, a person 
could be held accountable for the crime of genocide without necessarily having to establish that genocide had 
taken place throughout the country concerned.”7 
 
6.1. Where proof of intent is difficult 
Conceding that proving intent in genocidal cases could be difficult, or even impossible especially with regards to 
evidence gathering relating to confessional statements, the TC enumerates alternative means of establishing the 
presence of the subjective element in genocide. In the cases of Rutaganda, 8  Musema, 9  and Prosecutor v. 
Semanza,10 the TC noted that intent could be inferred: (a) from the material evidence submitted to the Chamber, 
including the evidence which demonstrates a consistent pattern of conduct by the Accused, (b) from the 
perpetrator’s actions-deeds or words which should naturally be decipherable from “patterns of purposeful 
action”;11 or (c) from the context of the act. However, this must be done on a case-by-case basis. Other factors 
from which intent can be inferred according to the TC in Akayesu includes the: 
 scale of atrocities committed 
 general nature of the atrocities committed in a region or a country; 
 fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a 
particular group, while excluding the members of other groups,  
 general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts 
 repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts; and or 
 the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate 
the very foundation of the group—acts which are not in themselves covered by the list . . . but 




1 See TC in Akaeyesu, 15 May 2003, para. 395 
2 Akayesu, note 30, para. 540-545: 
3 (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 94, 276 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
6 See Akayesu, note 30, at para. 731; and also Rutaganda, (Trial Chamber), December 6, 1999, para. 48-49 
7 Akayesu, Ibid 
8 (Trial Chamber), December 6, 1999, para. 61-63 
9 (Trial Chamber), January 27, 2000, para. 167 
10 Case No. ICTR-97-20 (Trial Chamber), May 15, 2003, para. 313: 
11 See the case of Bagilishema, (Trial Chamber), June 7, 2001, para. 63:  
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7. Problems associated with genocide 
Beginning with the Genocide Convention through the Statutes of the International Military Tribunals, down to the 
ICC Statute, state signatories are under obligation to "prevent and to punish" genocide. But since the adoption of 
the definition of genocide, specifically under the Genocide Convention, it has been shrouded in controversy and 
condemnation. For example, it has been condemned for being too narrow as it excludes targeted political and social 
groups; and is limited to direct acts against people to the exclusion of the environment.1 Furthermore, it has been 
argued that proving intention beyond reasonable doubt2 in genocide cases is extremely difficult. 3 Other difficulties 
associated with genocide include the fact that the concept is being devalued due to misuse,4 difficulty in measuring 
“in part”. There is also the problem of hesitation by member states to single out other members or intervene, as 
was the case in Rwanda.5 Be that as it may, genocide, as agreed by some,6 is recognisable.  
 
8. Distinction between genocide and other crimes  
Genocide is clearly a serious crime, and so are other crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. So the question is what 
sets genocide apart from the other crimes? For experts, 7 the nature of genocide as a crime that embodies special 
intent (dolus specialis) is what makes it distinctive. 8 The dolus specialis, according to Clark9 is the specific 
intention required as a constitutive element of the crime. 10   As pointed out above, it is that element that shows that 
the perpetrator clearly intend the outcome of the act for which he/she is charged. In the specific context of genocide, 
dolus specialis is “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. 11  In 
that regards, the TC observed that “the offender is culpable only when he has committed one of the offences 
charged under Article 2(2) of the Genocide Convention (Article 6 of ICC Statute) with the clear intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a particular group”. 12  Accordingly, Akayesu was found culpable mainly because he knew or 
should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group.” 13  This was reechoed in 
the TC’s Musema case.14 The TC stated in Rutaganda15 that one of the conditions upon which a person may be 
convicted of the offence of genocide is if the person committed one of the enumerated acts with “the specific intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group.”16   
 
9. Case Law on Elements of the Crime of Genocide 
Generally, genocide often occurs in societies where such groups become entangled or locked in identity-related 
conflicts.17 However, it is really not the differences in identity per se that generate tensions and conflicts. Rather, 
it is the real or perceived inequality associated with these differences in terms of access to power and resources, 
social services, development opportunities and the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms. This principally 
speaks to issues around the need to ensure equality in the society, good governance and constructive management 
of diversity as a means of eliminating gross political and economic inequalities among groups; and for promoting 
a common sense of belonging on equal footing. 
 
10. Conclusion/Recommendations 
Ironically, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 otherwise known as 
the Genocide Convention does not provide any punishment for the crime of genocide or genocide related matters.18 
Instead, the Convention empowered the Contracting. Parties to undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
 
1 See the TC in Akayesu case, note 30. 
2 Ibid. See also case of Bagilishema, (Trial Chamber), June 7, 2001, para. 63; and Kayishema case.  
3 Ibid 
4See Human Rights Watch, Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, <www.hrw.org> accessed 7 August 
2018. See also UN, Guidance Note: when to refer to a situation as genocide, <www.un.org> accessed 3 September 2018. 
5 BBC News, How the Genocide Happened (2011), <www.bbc.com> accessed 3 September 2018 
6 See for example, Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the 20th Century ()  
7 See Melinda Rankin, “The Future of International Criminal Evidence in New Wars? The Evolution of the Commission for International 
Justice and Accountability” (2018) Journal of Genocide Research 20 (3), 392-411. See also, Antonio Cassesse, note 28. See also, Raphael 
Lemkin, (1944),  Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 63, 90-94 
8 Ibid. 




12  Akayesu, note 30, para. 498, 517-522. 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid, para. 164. 
15 Ibid, para. 59 
16 Ibid 
17 For in-depth discussion on how identify-related conflict and inequality can cause war (and perhaps, genocide), see Gran Holmqvist, 
Inequality and Identity: causes of war? Discussion Paper 72, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2012, pp. 8-15 
18 Appendix B, p. 324 — 328, for the entire texts of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. .  
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respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Convention and, in 
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.1 But this lacuna is covered in Part 7 of 
Article 77 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  Unlike the Genocide Convention, the Rome 
Statute provides applicable penalties for a person convicted of genocide or genocide related matters.2 
Persons committing acts of genocide must ‘be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals’ under Articles 25 and 27 of ICC Statute. Although the provisions in both 
the Genocide Convention and the ICC Statute enjoin parties to enact the necessary legislation ‘to provide effective 
penalties for persons guilty of genocide,3 the most potent remedy would be to adopt preventive measures to 
forestall the occurrence of genocide. For example, states must address issues around guns and arms control. They 
can, in collaboration with the UN place embargo on countries and citizens involved in genocide activities. 
Prevention also involves enhanced national security measures and engaging in advocacy geared at discouraging 
the promotion of hate symbolisms-make them legally forbidden; and to make hate speeches culturally unacceptable. 
Additionally, the primary objective of criminalizing genocide by the Rome Statute is to ensure effective deterrence 
and to put an end to impunity. By its establishment, the message that has been sent to all and sundry , is that,  the 
international community will no longer tolerate such monstrous acts without assigning responsibility and meting 
out punishment , be it to Heads of States, commanding officers or any individual who is desirous to commit this 
heinous crime of genocide.. Similarly, in this era of internal and international displacements and enhanced refugee 
crisis, real safe areas or refugee escape corridors should be established with heavily armed international protection. 
The most effective preventive measure is to address the root causes of disaffection within and outside the state. 
That means, good governance, equality and the promotion of and respect for human rights and the rule of law 
should tower above self-interest. 
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